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Abstract	  
This	  article	  addresses	  the	  uses	  that	  record	  companies	  have	  made	  of	  two	  rhetorical	  	  
tropes.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  only	  one	  in	  ten	  artists	  succeed.	  The	  second	  is	  that	  they	  are	  
investing	  in	  new	  music.	  These	  two	  notions	  have	  been	  combined	  to	  give	  the	  
impression	  that	  record	  companies	  are	  risk	  taking	  both	  economically	  and	  
aesthetically.	  They	  have	  been	  employed	  to	  justify	  the	  companies’	  ownership	  of	  
sound	  recording	  copyright	  and	  their	  system	  of	  exclusive,	  long-­‐term	  recording	  
contracts.	  More	  recently,	  the	  rhetoric	  has	  been	  employed	  to	  combat	  piracy,	  extend	  
the	  term	  of	  sound	  recording	  copyright	  and	  to	  account	  for	  the	  continuing	  usefulness	  
of	  record	  companies.	  It	  is	  the	  argument	  of	  this	  article	  that	  investment	  in	  new	  music	  
is	  not	  necessarily	  risk	  taking;	  rather,	  it	  is	  policies	  derived	  from	  risk	  taking	  that	  
provide	  the	  financial	  security	  of	  record	  companies.	  	  
	  
Introduction	  PolyGram	  lawyer:	  Fiscally	  speaking,	  in	  1972	  American	  Century	  claimed	  six	  million	  dollars	  in	  profits	  yet	  92%	  of	  the	  records	  you	  released	  were	  –	  speaking	  frankly	  -­‐	  flops.	  
Richie	  Finestra,	  head	  of	  American	  Century	  Records:	  Technically,	  yes,	  but	  in	  reality	  they	  only	  look	  like	  flops.	  Head	  of	  PolyGram:	  Please	  explain	  .	  .	  .	  	  In	  Martin	  Scorsese’s	  Vinyl	  (2016)	  the	  record	  industry	  bosses	  come	  clean.	  Risk	  taking	  is	  no	  risk	  at	  all.	  New	  artists	  -­‐	  ‘not	  your	  most	  sophisticated	  individuals’	  -­‐	  are	  desperate	  to	  sign	  deals.	  They	  are	  given	  large	  advances	  but	  their	  contracts	  contain	  the	  magic	  word	  ‘recoupable’.	  Finestra	  outlines	  the	  consequences:	  No	  matter	  how	  many	  records	  they	  sell,	  the	  actual	  cost	  of	  producing	  that	  record	  always	  comes	  out	  of	  the	  artist’s	  end.	  Physically	  manufacturing	  the	  record;	  touring	  costs;	  studio	  space;	  marketing;	  packaging;	  if	  a	  drummer	  drinks	  a	  Pepsi	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  recording	  that	  album,	  believe	  me	  he’s	  paying	  for	  it	  at	  a	  700%	  mark	  up.	  We	  really	  don’t	  have	  any	  downside.	  His	  head	  of	  promotions	  backs	  him	  up,	  ‘we	  practically	  break	  even	  on	  all	  the	  flops.	  But	  the	  hits?	  That’s	  where	  we	  cash	  in	  big’.	  	  
Vinyl	  is	  set	  in	  1973,	  but	  its	  success	  ratio	  was	  in	  evidence	  25	  years	  earlier	  and	  is	  still	  being	  propounded	  today.	  For	  more	  than	  half	  a	  century,	  record	  companies	  have	  claimed	  that	  only	  one	  in	  ten	  of	  their	  artists	  will	  succeed.	  Michael	  Jones	  has	  argued	  that	  ‘We	  do	  not	  have	  to	  ask	  why	  the	  music	  industry	  lives	  with	  such	  a	  high	  failure	  rate;	  the	  answer	  is,	  simply	  and	  quite	  brutally,	  because	  it	  can	  afford	  to’	  (1997,	  p.	  28).	  It	  is	  nevertheless	  worth	  raising	  this	  question.	  Contrary	  to	  
Vinyl,	  the	  industry	  has	  maintained	  that	  its	  flops	  are	  flops:	  they	  result	  in	  losses	  for	  the	  companies	  concerned.	  It	  is	  the	  other	  half	  of	  the	  equation	  that	  makes	  the	  failure	  rate	  affordable.	  The	  record	  business	  is	  centred	  on	  blockbuster	  hits:	  the	  gains	  of	  the	  successes	  outweigh	  the	  losses	  of	  the	  failures.	  This	  much	  has	  been	  acknowledged	  (Frank	  and	  Cook	  2010,	  pp.	  106-­‐10).	  What	  has	  received	  less	  
attention	  is	  the	  strategy	  that	  underpins	  these	  economics.	  One	  reason	  why	  record	  companies	  can	  afford	  failure	  is	  because	  of	  failure	  itself.	  	  It	  is	  a	  strategy	  that	  is	  underpinned	  by	  rhetoric.	  The	  companies	  have	  combined	  two	  particular	  tropes.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  success	  ratio	  itself.	  It	  has	  been	  consistently	  utilised	  but	  is	  hard	  to	  verify.	  The	  second	  is	  that	  record	  companies	  are	  risk-­‐taking	  investors	  in	  new	  music.	  This	  trope	  casts	  the	  first	  in	  a	  benevolent	  light.	  Artists	  are	  not	  failing	  because	  record	  companies	  are	  bad	  at	  their	  jobs;	  they	  are	  failing	  because	  record	  companies	  dare	  to	  push	  boundaries.	  This	  rhetoric	  has	  had	  profound	  effects.	  It	  has	  been	  employed	  to	  justify	  stringent	  aspects	  of	  recording	  contracts	  and	  it	  underpins	  the	  record	  companies’	  ownership	  of	  sound	  recording	  copyright.	  Ultimately,	  it	  defends	  the	  economic	  base	  that	  the	  recording	  industry	  is	  built	  upon.	  This	  article	  explores	  the	  evolution	  of	  this	  rhetoric.	  It	  concentrates	  most	  fully	  on	  the	  British	  market,	  beginning	  by	  outlining	  sound	  recording	  copyright	  ownership	  under	  UK	  law.	  It	  then	  turns	  to	  the	  one	  in	  ten	  statistic,	  tracing	  its	  usage	  within	  the	  record	  industry	  and	  its	  analyses	  within	  academia.	  The	  article	  next	  addresses	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  ‘new’	  music,	  examining	  how	  risk	  taking	  has	  been	  used	  in	  defence	  of	  the	  record	  companies’	  ownership	  of	  sound	  recording	  copyright	  and	  then	  as	  a	  means	  to	  combat	  the	  piracy	  of	  this	  copyright	  and	  to	  extend	  its	  term.	  Although	  UK	  law	  relating	  to	  sound	  recording	  copyright	  has	  its	  own	  quirks	  and	  the	  use	  of	  industry	  rhetoric	  within	  the	  country	  has	  particular	  emphases,	  the	  ground	  covered	  here	  can	  be	  taken	  more	  broadly.	  Accordingly,	  the	  final	  section	  of	  this	  article	  looks	  at	  the	  promotional	  literature	  of	  the	  International	  Federation	  of	  the	  Phonographic	  Industry	  (IFPI).	  This	  organisation	  uses	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  success	  
ratios	  and	  new	  music	  to	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  still	  a	  need	  for	  record	  companies	  in	  the	  digital	  age.	  	  
Sound	  recording	  copyright	  in	  the	  UK	  In	  the	  early	  1990s,	  the	  British	  Monopolies	  and	  Mergers	  Commission	  (MMC)	  investigated	  the	  cost	  of	  compact	  discs	  in	  the	  UK,	  prompted	  by	  concerns	  that	  their	  high	  price	  was	  a	  result	  of	  monopoly	  situations	  within	  music	  businesses	  (MMC	  1994,	  p.	  3).	  The	  Commission’s	  findings	  were	  summarised	  in	  The	  Supply	  of	  
Recorded	  Music,	  which	  has	  been	  described	  by	  Martin	  Cloonan	  as	  ‘the	  most	  detailed	  analysis	  yet	  undertaken	  by	  a	  government	  body	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  parts	  of	  the	  music	  industries	  [...]	  work’	  (2007,	  p.	  70).	  This	  report’s	  main	  focus	  is	  on	  record	  companies.	  From	  the	  outset	  it	  underlines	  their	  financial	  core,	  stating	  that	  ‘Copyright	  is	  central	  to	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  record	  industry’	  (MMC	  1994,	  p.	  3).	  It	  is	  sound	  recording	  copyright	  that	  is	  being	  referred	  to	  here:	  the	  ownership	  of	  the	  recording	  masters.	  This	  right	  gives	  the	  companies	  control	  of	  the	  recordings;	  payment	  will	  be	  due	  to	  them	  for	  any	  sale	  or	  usage	  throughout	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  copyright	  term.	  In	  addition,	  as	  the	  International	  Managers	  Forum	  (IMF)	  pointed	  out	  to	  the	  MMC,	  ‘the	  copyright	  catalogues	  of	  the	  record	  companies	  are	  their	  most	  valuable	  asset’	  (ibid.,	  p.	  173).	  	  	   The	  Supply	  of	  Recorded	  Music	  suggests	  that	  ‘Under	  the	  1988	  Copyright	  Act	  the	  copyright	  would	  normally	  be	  owned	  by	  the	  record	  company’	  (ibid.,	  p.	  30).	  This	  is	  only	  partially	  correct.	  Although	  record	  companies	  do	  normally	  assume	  control	  of	  sound	  recording	  copyrights,	  ownership	  is	  not	  confirmed	  by	  the	  1988	  Act.	  The	  subject	  is	  dealt	  within	  in	  clause	  9.2a,	  which	  also	  concerns	  film	  production.	  As	  first	  published,	  the	  clause	  stated	  that	  the	  ‘author’	  of	  these	  art	  
forms	  is	  ‘the	  person	  by	  whom	  the	  arrangements	  necessary	  for	  the	  making	  of	  the	  recording	  or	  film	  are	  undertaken’	  (CDPA	  1988,	  p.	  5).1	  ‘Arrangements’	  is	  a	  loose	  word.	  It	  could	  indicate	  that	  the	  owner	  of	  sound	  recording	  copyright	  is	  the	  party	  that	  commissioned	  it.	  If	  so,	  the	  record	  companies	  possibly	  are	  the	  proper	  owners.	  There	  are	  many	  parties	  involved	  in	  arranging	  a	  recording	  project,	  but	  it	  is	  the	  signing	  policies	  and	  release	  schedules	  of	  record	  companies	  that	  determine	  the	  existence	  of	  most	  commercially	  released	  recordings.2	  This	  has	  not	  been	  the	  record	  companies’	  own	  interpretation	  of	  the	  term,	  however.	  They	  have	  emphasised	  instead	  that	  the	  ‘arranger’	  is	  the	  party	  who	  has	  paid	  for	  the	  recording.	  Ironically,	  this	  interpretation	  problematizes	  their	  ownership	  claims.	  	   The	  norm	  of	  record	  company	  ownership	  of	  sound	  recording	  copyright	  was	  established	  via	  earlier	  copyright	  legislation.	  In	  Britain,	  the	  subject	  was	  first	  covered	  in	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  of	  1911.	  Clause	  19.1	  states	  that	  ‘first	  owner’	  of	  sound	  recording	  copyright	  is	  ‘the	  person	  who	  was	  the	  owner	  of	  such	  original	  plate	  at	  the	  time	  when	  such	  plate	  was	  made’,	  adding	  that	  this	  ‘person’	  can	  be	  a	  ‘body	  corporate’	  (CA	  1911,	  p.	  12).	  In	  the	  early	  years	  of	  sound	  recording,	  the	  owner	  would	  therefore	  have	  been	  the	  record	  company.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  1911	  Act,	  music	  was	  recorded	  directly	  to	  acetate	  discs.	  These	  ‘plates’	  were	  commonly	  recorded	  in	  the	  record	  companies’	  own	  studios	  and	  were	  produced	  and	  engineered	  by	  salaried	  employees.	  Few	  artists	  had	  record	  contracts;	  they	  were	  instead	  paid	  session	  fees	  and	  perhaps	  an	  annual	  retainer	  (Martland	  2013,	  pp.	  187-­‐191).	  They	  would	  have	  had	  no	  claim	  to	  ownership	  of	  the	  copyright.	  	  This	  position	  was	  reinforced	  in	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  of	  1956.	  Clause	  12.4	  states	  that	  ‘the	  maker	  of	  a	  sound	  recording	  shall	  be	  entitled	  to	  any	  copyright	  subsisting	  in	  the	  recording’	  (CA	  1956,	  pp.	  19-­‐20).	  The	  Act	  does	  add	  a	  provision,	  
however,	  stating	  that	  ‘where	  a	  person	  commissions	  the	  making	  of	  a	  sound	  recording,	  and	  pays	  or	  agrees	  to	  pay	  for	  it	  in	  money	  or	  money’s	  worth,	  and	  the	  recording	  is	  made	  in	  pursuance	  of	  that	  commission,	  that	  person,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  agreement	  to	  the	  contrary,	  shall	  be	  entitled	  to	  any	  copyright	  subsisting	  in	  the	  recording’	  (ibid.,	  pp.	  19-­‐20).	  This	  addition	  is	  indicative	  of	  changes	  in	  the	  sound	  recording	  world:	  some	  sessions	  were	  now	  taking	  place	  away	  from	  record	  company	  premises.	  It	  also	  provided	  several	  hoops	  that	  record	  companies	  had	  to	  go	  through	  to	  justify	  their	  ownership	  of	  copyright.	  They	  had	  to	  have	  commissioned	  the	  works	  and	  paid	  for	  them	  and	  ensured	  that	  this	  ownership	  was	  not	  compromised	  in	  contractual	  agreements.	  	  In	  contrast,	  the	  1988	  Copyright,	  Designs	  and	  Patents	  Act	  offers	  no	  qualification	  of	  the	  phrase	  ‘the	  person	  by	  whom	  the	  arrangements	  necessary	  for	  making	  the	  recording	  are	  undertaken’.	  Its	  definition	  of	  ownership	  is	  more	  compact	  and	  it	  aims	  for	  greater	  flexibility.	  As	  well	  as	  covering	  both	  film	  and	  sound	  recording,	  it	  attempts	  to	  capture	  developments	  in	  each	  of	  these	  fields.	  Importantly,	  it	  legislates	  for	  a	  transformation	  in	  record	  industry	  practice.	  By	  the	  time	  of	  the	  1988	  Act	  the	  contemporary	  method	  of	  arranging	  recording	  sessions	  had	  been	  established.	  Most	  musicians	  are	  issued	  with	  recording	  budgets.	  These	  are	  usually	  spent	  on	  independent	  recording	  studios	  with	  independent	  staff.	  In	  support	  of	  their	  decision	  that	  record	  companies	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  ‘normal’	  owners	  of	  sound	  recording	  copyright,	  the	  MMC	  referred	  to	  a	  House	  of	  Lords	  debate	  about	  the	  drafting	  of	  the	  1988	  Act.	  Lord	  Williams	  of	  Elvel	  had	  felt	  that	  the	  wording	  of	  clause	  9.2a	  was	  unclear	  and	  proposed	  instead	  that	  the	  copyright	  owner	  be	  defined	  as	  the	  person	  ‘who	  commissions	  that	  recording	  and	  pays	  or	  agrees	  to	  pay	  for	  it	  in	  money	  or	  money’s	  worth’;	  he	  also	  suggested	  that	  
film	  directors	  should	  share	  copyright	  ownership	  with	  film	  producers	  (HL	  Deb	  30	  November	  1987).	  Lord	  Beaverbrook’s	  response	  was	  quoted	  by	  the	  MMC:	  The	  Bill	  deals	  with	  copyright	  in	  sound	  recordings	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  the	  present	  law	  [i.e.	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  1956]	  treats	  films;	  namely,	  that	  the	  first	  owner	  is	  the	  person	  who	  makes	  the	  necessary	  arrangements	  for	  the	  recording.	  This	  approach	  works	  satisfactorily	  for	  films	  and	  we	  believe	  will	  do	  so	  for	  sound	  recordings	  ...	  to	  give	  the	  director	  a	  copyright	  in	  the	  film	  would	  not	  be	  fair	  to	  the	  person	  who	  has	  made	  and	  paid	  for	  the	  arrangements	  for	  the	  film	  production.	  (MMC	  1994,	  p.	  51)	  The	  ellipsis	  in	  this	  passage	  belongs	  to	  The	  Supply	  of	  Recorded	  Music	  itself	  but	  Beaverbrook’s	  excerpted	  argument	  is	  worth	  noting.	  He	  claimed	  that	  the	  initial	  wording	  of	  clause	  9.2a	  ‘largely	  sweeps	  up	  the	  question	  of	  commissions	  since	  record	  companies	  commissioning	  independent	  recording	  studios	  will	  be	  the	  body	  making	  the	  necessary	  arrangements,	  not	  the	  studios’	  (HL	  Deb	  30	  November	  1987).	  	  Lord	  Williams	  of	  Elvel	  withdrew	  his	  amendment.	  Consequently,	  clause	  9.2a	  was	  published	  as	  drafted	  and	  contained	  no	  specific	  mention	  of	  payment	  for	  recordings.	  The	  major	  British	  record	  companies	  wished	  to	  bring	  attention	  to	  this	  aspect	  of	  arranging,	  nonetheless.	  In	  The	  Supply	  of	  Recorded	  Music	  they	  made	  the	  following	  joint	  statement:	  It	  was	  clear	  that,	  in	  drafting	  the	  relevant	  provisions	  of	  the	  1988	  Copyright	  Act	  dealing	  with	  the	  grant	  of	  copyright	  in	  sound	  recordings,	  Parliament	  had	  intended	  that	  the	  record	  company	  should	  be	  the	  holder	  of	  that	  right,	  since	  it	  was	  the	  record	  company	  which	  generally	  made	  the	  necessary	  arrangements	  for	  the	  making	  of	  the	  recording,	  including	  the	  provision	  of	  
the	  necessary	  finance.	  There	  was	  authority	  as	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘the	  person	  by	  whom	  the	  arrangements	  ...	  are	  undertaken’	  in	  relation	  to	  films.	  The	  courts	  had	  held	  that	  the	  word	  ‘undertake’	  meant	  ‘be	  responsible	  for’,	  especially	  in	  the	  financial	  sense	  but	  also	  generally.	  It	  could	  therefore	  be	  assumed	  that	  in	  using	  the	  same	  formula	  for	  sound	  recordings	  as	  for	  films	  in	  the	  1988	  Copyright	  Act,	  Parliament	  had	  intended	  that	  copyright	  should	  vest	  in	  the	  person	  who	  had	  undertaken	  the	  financial	  responsibility	  for	  making	  the	  recording.	  The	  ownership	  of	  that	  copyright	  was	  the	  reward	  for	  the	  risk	  they	  had	  undertaken.	  (1994,	  pp.	  252-­‐3)	  Although	  record	  companies	  have	  usually	  been	  rewarded	  with	  this	  copyright,	  there	  remains	  a	  lack	  of	  clarity	  around	  the	  word	  ‘arrangements’.	  Moreover,	  the	  record	  companies’	  claims	  have	  been	  undermined	  by	  their	  own	  logic.	  It	  is	  now	  artists,	  rather	  than	  record	  companies,	  who	  take	  the	  financial	  responsibility	  for	  recordings;	  or	  at	  least	  they	  attempt	  to.	  Artists’	  recording	  budgets	  are	  commonly	  issued	  in	  the	  form	  of	  advances.	  The	  record	  companies	  claw	  these	  advances	  back	  from	  the	  artists’	  royalties:	  these	  funds	  are	  ‘recoupable’.	  If	  the	  companies’	  own	  interpretation	  of	  the	  law	  is	  correct,	  then	  recouped	  artists	  could	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  rightful	  owners	  of	  the	  copyright	  in	  their	  sound	  recordings.	  They	  have,	  after	  all,	  taken	  full	  financial	  responsibility	  for	  them.	  	  	   The	  record	  companies’	  logic	  is	  also	  undermined	  by	  their	  contracts.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  shore	  up	  their	  ownership	  of	  sound	  recording	  copyrights,	  a	  standard	  exclusive	  recording	  contract	  will	  stipulate	  that	  the	  artist	  must	  ‘assign’	  the	  copyright	  in	  their	  sound	  recordings	  to	  them,	  typically	  for	  the	  life	  of	  copyright.	  This	  harks	  back	  to	  the	  1956	  Act:	  the	  companies	  are	  establishing	  their	  claims	  to	  copyright	  by	  paying	  for	  sound	  recordings	  and	  making	  agreements.	  These	  claims	  
are	  contradictory,	  however.	  Why	  are	  record	  companies	  asking	  for	  the	  assignment	  of	  copyright	  if	  they	  believe	  the	  1988	  Act	  defines	  them	  as	  the	  ‘arrangers’,	  and	  therefore	  the	  first	  owners,	  of	  sound	  recordings?	  	   This	  conundrum	  remains	  unanswered.	  The	  record	  companies	  do	  provide	  a	  rationale	  for	  their	  ownership	  of	  sound	  recording	  copyright,	  however.	  They	  argue	  that	  only	  one	  in	  ten	  of	  their	  artists	  will	  achieve	  profitability.	  In	  highlighting	  this	  imbalance,	  they	  suggest	  that,	  over	  all,	  it	  is	  record	  companies	  who	  shoulder	  the	  risk	  of	  financing	  sound	  recordings.	  As	  such,	  they	  deserve	  the	  copyrights	  of	  the	  few	  successes	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  losses	  of	  the	  many	  failures.	  It	  is	  to	  this	  one	  in	  ten	  statistic	  and	  its	  rhetorical	  uses	  that	  we	  now	  must	  turn.	  	  	  
Success	  ratios	  An	  early	  use	  of	  the	  one	  in	  ten	  statistic	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Billboard,	  21	  July	  1958.	  Bob	  Rolontz	  calculated	  that	  there	  were	  about	  100	  singles	  released	  in	  the	  American	  market	  each	  week,	  a	  figure	  he	  regarded	  as	  ‘overproduction’:	  Since	  less	  than	  10	  per	  cent	  of	  all	  records	  released	  become	  hits,	  and	  the	  figure	  is	  closer	  to	  5	  per	  cent	  than	  10	  per	  cent,	  the	  majority	  of	  them	  hardly	  sell	  at	  all.	  Possibly	  60	  per	  cent	  of	  all	  released	  sell	  2,000	  to	  3,000.	  Another	  20	  per	  cent	  sell	  up	  to	  25,000.	  And	  another	  10	  per	  cent	  sell	  50,000	  or	  more.	  The	  hit	  10	  per	  cent	  sell	  the	  100,000	  to	  1,000,000	  records.	  In	  other	  words	  80	  per	  cent	  of	  all	  records	  released	  are	  a	  loss	  for	  all	  concerned	  (Rolontz	  1958A,	  p.	  4)	  From	  the	  outset	  we	  witness	  two	  characteristics	  of	  success	  ratios.	  First,	  they	  can	  be	  measured	  in	  different	  ways.	  Rolontz	  begins	  by	  examining	  the	  ratio	  of	  hits	  to	  
releases	  and	  then	  addresses	  the	  profitability	  of	  recordings.	  The	  second	  is	  that	  success	  rates	  can	  vary:	  the	  article	  alternates	  between	  5%,	  10%	  and	  20%.	  It	  is	  nevertheless	  the	  one	  in	  ten	  statistic	  that	  the	  record	  industry	  has	  most	  commonly	  used.	  Rolontz	  employed	  it	  in	  relation	  to	  albums	  in	  the	  following	  week’s	  Billboard,	  arguing	  that	  ‘true	  money	  making	  LP’s	  are	  certainly	  no	  more	  than	  10	  per	  cent	  of	  all	  released’	  (1958B,	  p.	  10).	  By	  the	  following	  decade	  the	  statistic	  was	  being	  used	  in	  Britain.	  In	  1966,	  Melody	  Maker	  asked,	  ‘If,	  as	  the	  record	  companies	  now	  admit,	  nine	  out	  of	  ten	  singles	  fail	  to	  make	  the	  Pop	  Fifty,	  what	  can	  the	  aspiring	  popper	  do	  to	  shorten	  the	  odds	  against	  his	  getting	  that	  elusive	  hit	  record’?	  (Melody	  Maker	  1966,	  p.	  8).	  The	  statistic	  remained	  in	  use	  thirty	  years	  later.	  The	  Supply	  of	  Recorded	  Music	  reported,	  ‘The	  majors	  tell	  us	  that	  only	  one	  in	  ten	  of	  the	  pop	  artists	  with	  whom	  they	  sign	  contracts	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  successful’	  (MMC	  1994,	  p.	  24).	  A	  great	  deal	  rested	  upon	  this	  statement,	  but	  it	  remained	  unchallenged	  and	  unverified	  by	  the	  MMC.	  British	  politicians	  were	  similarly	  compliant.	  In	  1997,	  Chris	  Smith,	  the	  Labour	  Party’s	  Culture	  Secretary,	  echoed	  industry	  claims	  that	  ‘On	  average,	  80-­‐90	  per	  cent	  of	  artists	  signed	  to	  record	  companies	  will	  not	  succeed’	  (1997,	  p.	  81).	  Meanwhile,	  the	  ratio	  maintained	  its	  presence	  in	  the	  US:	  in	  the	  early	  1970s,	  it	  was	  argued	  that	  ‘only	  10	  percent	  [of	  records]	  smelled	  “break	  even”’	  (Denisoff	  1975,	  p.	  5);	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  it	  was	  claimed	  that	  ‘Nine	  out	  of	  ten	  acts	  signed	  to	  record	  contracts	  are	  losers’	  (Goodman	  1997,	  p.	  232).	  Writing	  in	  2014,	  Simon	  Napier-­‐Bell	  summed	  up	  the	  statistic’s	  persistence:	  	  the	  ratio	  of	  success	  is	  what	  it	  always	  was	  –	  for	  every	  ten	  artists	  signed,	  nine	  will	  get	  nowhere.	  A	  contract	  with	  a	  major	  record	  company	  was	  
always	  a	  90	  per	  cent	  guarantee	  of	  failure	  and	  it	  still	  is	  today.	  (2014,	  p.	  285)	  The	  endurance	  of	  the	  statistic	  is	  remarkable.	  It	  has	  survived	  despite	  significant	  changes	  in	  record	  industry	  practice.	  Three	  factors	  in	  particular	  should	  have	  affected	  its	  consistency.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  the	  industry	  has	  gone	  through	  peaks	  and	  troughs.	  The	  usual	  reaction	  of	  record	  companies	  during	  leaner	  times	  is	  to	  cut	  the	  size	  of	  their	  artist	  rosters	  and	  introduce	  more	  cautious	  signing	  policies.	  As	  a	  result	  there	  should	  be	  a	  higher	  ratio	  of	  hits	  to	  releases	  during	  hard	  times,	  at	  least	  if	  measured	  in	  relation	  to	  chart	  entries.	  The	  second	  is	  that	  major	  record	  companies	  have	  moved	  from	  an	  industry	  model	  whereby	  they	  manufactured	  records,	  to	  one	  where	  there	  is	  there	  is	  less	  physical	  manufacture,	  most	  of	  which	  is	  undertaken	  by	  outside	  companies.	  In	  the	  1970s,	  the	  majors’	  manufacturing	  interests	  were	  viewed	  as	  a	  cause	  of	  overproduction,	  as	  these	  companies	  needed	  to	  generate	  sufficient	  product	  to	  keep	  their	  pressing	  plants	  busy	  (Denisoff	  1975,	  pp.	  97-­‐8).	  Manufacture	  also	  provided	  a	  platform	  from	  which	  to	  experiment.	  The	  majors	  manufactured	  product	  for	  smaller	  companies,	  thus	  gaining	  a	  steady	  stream	  of	  income	  that	  safeguarded	  them	  against	  the	  ‘adverse	  financial	  impact	  resulting	  from	  the	  considerable	  risk	  involved	  in	  speculative	  investment	  in	  new	  recording	  artists’	  (Hill	  1978,	  p.	  32).	  As	  such,	  some	  commentators	  believe	  they	  took	  greater	  artistic	  chances	  when	  they	  were	  in	  the	  manufacturing	  business	  (Harrison	  2011,	  p.	  171).	  The	  third	  factor	  is	  that	  record	  companies	  have	  become	  increasingly	  sophisticated	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  consumer	  data.	  From	  an	  industry	  which	  did	  little	  audience	  analysis,	  we	  now	  have	  one	  that	  conducts	  detailed	  market	  research,	  taking	  full	  advantage	  of	  the	  digitisation	  of	  consumer	  activity	  
(Frith	  2001,	  p.	  34).	  Despite	  this	  wealth	  of	  data,	  the	  one	  in	  ten	  success	  rate	  persists.	  	   The	  ratio	  is	  slippery,	  however;	  it	  has	  been	  used	  to	  measure	  different	  things.	  As	  we	  have	  moved	  through	  this	  time	  period	  it	  has	  less	  regularly	  been	  employed	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  ratio	  of	  hits	  to	  releases,	  which	  is	  just	  about	  quantifiable,	  to	  instead	  addressing	  the	  proportion	  of	  records	  that	  are	  profitable.	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  profitability,	  we	  have	  to	  trust	  the	  record	  companies’	  own	  calculations.	  They	  do	  not	  publicise	  precise	  sales	  figures,	  nor	  do	  they	  detail	  breakeven	  points	  of	  releases,	  which	  can	  vary	  widely	  (Osborne	  2014,	  pp.	  164-­‐6).	  There	  has	  also	  been	  variation	  regarding	  which	  breakeven	  point	  they	  use.	  Sometimes	  they	  employ	  the	  statistic	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  recoupment	  of	  an	  artist’s	  personal,	  recording	  and	  video	  advances;	  at	  others	  it	  is	  applied	  to	  the	  overall	  expenditure	  on	  a	  release,	  adding	  in	  the	  costs	  of	  manufacture,	  distribution,	  marketing	  and	  promotion.	  What	  also	  gets	  obscured	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  artists	  and	  record	  companies	  have	  different	  breakeven	  points.	  A	  ‘failed’	  record	  for	  an	  artist	  may	  be	  profitable	  for	  their	  record	  company.	  Interviewed	  in	  1971,	  Warner	  executive	  Joe	  Smith	  admitted	  that	  his	  artists	  received	  a	  lower	  share	  of	  profits	  than	  his	  company	  did,	  therefore	  their	  debts	  took	  longer	  to	  pay	  off:	  ‘they’re	  recovering	  it	  at	  a	  lesser	  rate	  than	  we	  are’	  (Sanjek	  and	  Sanjek	  1991,	  p.	  212).	  He	  calculated	  that	  it	  would	  take	  sales	  of	  100,000	  albums	  for	  an	  artist	  to	  recoup	  ‘their	  advance	  and	  recording	  costs,	  and	  from	  then	  on	  they’re	  making	  money.	  But	  only	  10	  to	  15	  percent	  of	  the	  albums	  sell	  that	  well’	  (ibid.).	  Some	  academics	  have	  questioned	  the	  veracity	  of	  success	  ratios.	  Writing	  in	  the	  1990s,	  Keith	  Negus	  reported	  an	  industry	  belief	  that	  only	  one	  in	  eight	  artists	  recoup	  their	  advances.	  While	  arguing	  that	  this	  is	  ‘an	  elusive	  figure,	  hard	  to	  verify	  
and	  as	  mythical	  as	  it	  is	  statistical’,	  he	  noted	  that	  some	  genres	  have	  a	  higher	  hit	  rate	  than	  others	  (1999,	  pp.	  47-­‐50).	  In	  2013,	  Lee	  Marshall	  listed	  a	  number	  of	  one	  in	  ten	  citations.	  He	  questioned	  their	  ‘seeming	  truism’	  and	  suggested	  ‘the	  failure	  rate	  may	  not	  be	  as	  high	  as	  conventionally	  perceived’	  (2013,	  pp.	  583,	  584).	  Other	  academics	  have	  tested	  the	  ratios	  out.	  In	  the	  early	  1970s,	  Simon	  Frith	  quantified	  ‘A	  Year	  of	  Singles	  in	  Britain’,	  finding	  a	  success	  rate	  of	  ‘about	  one	  in	  eleven’	  (1974,	  p.	  40).	  In	  addition,	  he	  discovered	  that	  independent	  labels	  had	  a	  better	  profitability	  ratio	  than	  majors	  (ibid.,	  p.	  39).	  Jones	  undertook	  a	  similar	  exercise	  in	  1995,	  tracking	  a	  week’s	  worth	  of	  single	  releases	  to	  monitor	  how	  many	  made	  the	  charts	  (1997,	  pp.	  38-­‐48).	  His	  main	  concern	  was	  nevertheless	  with	  the	  overall	  profitability	  of	  acts.	  Although	  he	  discovered	  that	  ‘the	  scale	  of	  failure	  is	  still	  enormous’,	  he	  conceded:	  	  Without	  knowing	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  recording	  and	  the	  promotional	  budgets	  for	  a	  new	  act;	  or	  the	  extent	  of	  recoupable	  debt	  for	  an	  ‘established’	  act,	  we	  cannot	  know	  the	  sales	  target	  figure	  for	  a	  release	  by	  that	  act.	  Without	  knowing	  the	  sales	  target	  figure,	  and	  with	  no	  access	  to	  actual	  numbers	  of	  records	  sold,	  we	  can’t	  judge	  whether	  the	  act	  in	  question	  is	  regarded	  by	  their	  label	  as	  either	  succeeding	  or	  failing.	  (ibid.,	  p.	  47)	  While	  the	  statistic	  has	  remained	  much	  the	  same,	  the	  academic	  accounts	  of	  it	  have	  changed.	  In	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  it	  was	  used	  as	  evidence	  of	  a	  ‘mud	  against	  the	  wall’	  approach	  to	  releasing	  music	  (Chapple	  and	  Garofalo	  1977,	  p.	  14).	  Paul	  Hirsch	  documented	  a	  record	  company	  belief	  that	  ‘There	  are	  no	  formulas	  for	  producing	  a	  hit	  record’	  (Hirsch	  1971/2,	  p.	  655).	  Labels	  would	  therefore	  issue	  an	  array	  of	  titles,	  hoping	  some	  would	  stick.	  Bernard	  Miège	  drew	  pessimistic	  conclusions	  from	  this	  scenario,	  arguing	  that	  it	  resulted	  in	  job	  insecurity	  and	  
impecuniosity	  for	  artists	  (1989,	  pp.	  89-­‐90).	  In	  contrast,	  Frith	  saw	  it	  as	  evidence	  of	  consumer	  sovereignty	  (1978,	  p.	  97).	  For	  David	  Hesmondhalgh	  the	  signing	  policies	  of	  these	  decades	  resulted	  in	  ‘a	  substantial	  degree	  of	  artistic	  innovation	  and	  experimentation’	  (2013,	  p.	  249).	  	  	   By	  the	  1990s,	  the	  costs	  of	  recording,	  promoting	  and	  marketing	  records	  had	  increased	  considerably	  (Negus	  1992,	  p.	  40).	  This	  was	  also	  the	  era	  in	  which	  more	  sophisticated	  methods	  of	  audience	  and	  sales	  analysis	  took	  hold.	  Negus	  argued	  that	  this	  resulted	  in	  ‘a	  straightforward	  reluctance	  to	  experiment,	  a	  reduction	  in	  risk-­‐taking	  and	  a	  propensity	  towards	  a	  partial	  view	  of	  the	  world’	  (1999,	  p.	  52).	  Jones	  suggested	  that	  record	  companies	  were	  no	  longer	  involved	  in	  ‘overproduction’;	  they	  were	  instead	  ‘over-­‐signing’	  new	  acts	  (1997,	  p.	  313).	  This	  policy	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  more	  cost-­‐effective.	  Although	  record	  companies	  would	  ‘initiate	  the	  commodification	  of	  a	  number	  of	  commodities’,	  they	  would	  ‘choose	  to	  concentrate	  marketing	  and	  promotional	  resources	  on	  only	  a	  proportion	  of	  these	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  “intelligence”	  garnered	  from	  the	  market	  place’	  (ibid.,	  p.	  149).	  The	  essential	  point	  of	  analysis	  was	  no	  longer	  what	  happened	  once	  a	  record	  was	  in	  the	  market,	  but	  the	  system	  of	  prioritisation	  that	  had	  taken	  place	  before	  it	  was	  released.	  	  	   Building	  on	  these	  studies,	  some	  writers	  have	  suggested	  that	  record	  companies	  have	  a	  systematic	  approach	  to	  failure:	  it	  is	  the	  condition	  to	  which	  the	  industry	  constantly	  aspires.	  By	  2001,	  Frith	  was	  viewing	  success	  ratios	  in	  a	  new	  light.	  He	  asked,	  ‘What	  if	  a	  record’s	  failure	  reflects	  not	  the	  irrational	  activities	  of	  musicians	  and	  consumers	  but	  the	  perfectly	  rational	  activities	  of	  record	  companies	  themselves?’	  (2001,	  p.	  47).	  In	  contemplating	  why	  a	  record	  company	  would	  chose	  not	  to	  promote	  some	  of	  its	  artists,	  he	  outlined	  the	  following	  areas	  of	  
policy:	  	  	  the	  development	  of	  the	  portfolio	  management	  structure;	  the	  carefully	  orchestrated	  programme	  of	  global	  release	  and	  promotion;	  the	  calculation	  of	  what	  budgets	  are	  available	  for	  what	  products	  when;	  a	  sense	  at	  any	  one	  moment	  of	  to	  which	  project	  is	  makes	  most	  sense	  to	  devote	  energy.	  (2001,	  p.	  48)	  More	  recently,	  Marshall	  has	  suggested	  that	  ‘the	  high	  failure	  rate	  associated	  with	  the	  record	  labels	  can	  [...]	  have	  some	  beneficial	  aspects	  for	  labels’,	  pointing	  out	  that	  it	  ‘serves	  important	  rhetorical	  purposes	  in	  relation	  to	  governments,	  policy	  makers,	  and	  consumers,	  and	  [...]	  in	  contractual	  negotiations	  with	  its	  artists’	  (2013,	  p.	  584).	  Although	  profitability	  is	  difficult	  to	  verify,	  the	  statistic	  should	  not	  be	  dismissed	  out	  of	  hand.	  The	  majority	  of	  recording	  projects	  do	  fail	  to	  breakeven.	  More	  importantly,	  Marshall	  is	  right:	  the	  success	  ratio	  has	  been	  tactically	  employed.	  It	  has	  been	  used	  in	  defence	  of	  a	  contractual	  system	  that	  binds	  artists	  to	  record	  companies	  in	  exclusivity	  for	  long	  durations,	  with	  any	  options	  regarding	  duration	  being	  in	  the	  company’s	  favour.	  It	  has	  also	  justified	  the	  companies’	  ownership	  of	  sound	  recording	  copyright.	  The	  Supply	  of	  Recorded	  Music	  is	  illustrative	  of	  industry	  thinking.	  The	  record	  companies	  argued	  that	  ‘exclusivity	  and	  other	  provisions	  on	  copyright	  and	  length	  of	  contract	  are	  essential	  to	  enable	  the	  industry	  to	  function	  at	  all’	  (MMC	  1994,	  p.	  13).	  Having	  heard	  evidence	  from	  each	  of	  the	  major	  record	  companies,	  the	  MMC	  decided:	  	  It	  was	  only	  by	  concluding	  contracts	  which	  embodied	  such	  terms	  as	  retention	  of	  copyright,	  exclusivity	  and	  a	  reasonable	  length	  of	  contract	  term	  that	  the	  companies	  could	  reap	  the	  necessary	  long-­‐term	  benefits	  for	  
those	  few	  artists	  who	  succeeded	  and	  that	  the	  artists	  who	  succeeded	  could	  reap	  the	  long-­‐term	  benefits	  in	  their	  development	  and	  career.	  (1994,	  p.	  251).	  	  But	  why	  have	  so	  few	  artists	  achieved	  profitability?	  One	  reason	  is	  because	  they	  are	  given	  high	  advances,	  which	  are	  therefore	  difficult	  to	  recoup.	  Giving	  evidence	  to	  the	  MMC,	  the	  record	  companies	  maintained	  that	  ‘in	  general	  new	  artists	  currently	  preferred	  to	  secure	  larger	  advances	  and	  royalties	  rather	  than	  ownership	  of	  copyright’	  (ibid.,	  p.	  29).	  This	  statement	  warranted	  closer	  inspection.	  In	  this	  instance,	  the	  companies	  were	  suggesting	  that	  ownership	  of	  recording	  copyright	  rested	  on	  contractual	  negotiation	  rather	  than	  being	  determined	  by	  the	  1988	  Act.	  This	  allowed	  them	  to	  promote	  artist	  agency	  when	  it	  came	  to	  the	  setting	  of	  advance	  fees,	  although	  they	  had	  elsewhere	  admitted	  at	  least	  partial	  responsibility	  for	  their	  scope:	  one	  of	  the	  major	  labels	  argued	  that	  they	  were	  set	  ‘between	  that	  level	  of	  advance	  necessary	  to	  persuade	  the	  artist	  to	  accept	  the	  offer	  in	  preference	  to	  a	  rival	  record	  company,	  and	  a	  prudent	  maximum,	  given	  the	  unpredictability	  of	  an	  artist’s	  reception	  in	  the	  market’	  (ibid.,	  p.	  227).	  The	  record	  companies	  were	  also	  suggesting	  that,	  for	  artists,	  high	  advances	  and	  copyright	  ownership	  should	  be	  considered	  mutually	  exclusive,	  but	  this	  argument	  rested	  on	  the	  failure	  of	  most	  artists	  to	  recoup.	  We	  therefore	  need	  to	  ask	  whose	  interests	  have	  best	  been	  served	  by	  the	  system	  of	  high	  advances.	  Another	  reason	  why	  so	  many	  records	  fail	  to	  achieve	  profitability	  is	  because	  of	  the	  high	  costs	  of	  marketing	  and	  promotion,	  but	  these	  costs	  are	  high	  because	  there	  are	  so	  many	  records.	  Broadcasters	  and	  journalists	  are	  faced	  with	  a	  plethora	  of	  releases.	  One	  way	  to	  filter	  them	  is	  to	  assess	  marketing	  expenditure.	  Marshall	  noted	  that	  ‘failing	  to	  spend	  substantial	  amounts	  on	  independent	  
promoters	  makes	  it	  look	  like	  the	  label	  is	  not	  serious	  about	  a	  record,	  thus	  dooming	  it	  to	  failure’	  (Marshall	  2013,	  p.	  583).	  This	  expenditure	  has	  enabled	  major	  record	  companies	  to	  exercise	  their	  power.	  In	  America,	  for	  example,	  there	  have	  been	  times	  when	  promotion	  has	  become	  so	  expensive	  that	  only	  the	  largest	  labels	  can	  afford	  it,	  thus	  providing	  ‘a	  means	  to	  keep	  small	  companies	  off	  the	  charts’	  (Dannen	  2003,	  p.	  264).	  It	  is	  the	  major	  record	  companies,	  ultimately,	  who	  have	  set	  the	  bar	  for	  the	  success	  ratio	  high,	  and	  yet	  they	  have	  argued	  that	  they	  deserve	  compensation	  for	  its	  effects.	  In	  doing	  so,	  they	  have	  received	  ample	  rewards.	  Their	  contractual	  policies	  have	  received	  official	  approval	  and	  their	  ownership	  of	  copyright	  has	  been	  endorsed.	  To	  achieve	  this,	  however,	  they	  have	  had	  to	  cast	  their	  failure	  in	  a	  positive	  light.	  And	  this	  is	  where	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  new	  music	  comes	  in.	  	  	  
New	  music	  The	  tactical	  employment	  of	  new	  music	  is	  a	  recent	  trend	  when	  compared	  with	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  success	  ratios.	  The	  two	  phenomena	  have	  nevertheless	  long	  been	  considered	  in	  tandem.	  They	  are,	  for	  example,	  brought	  together	  in	  the	  21	  July	  1958	  Billboard	  article	  cited	  above.	  Rolontz	  believed	  that	  overproduction	  had	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  new	  acts,	  arguing	  that	  record	  companies	  provided	  them	  with	  little	  ‘staying	  power’	  as	  they	  were	  constantly	  looking	  for	  acts	  that	  were	  newer	  still	  (1958A,	  p.	  4).	  	  
The	  Supply	  of	  Recorded	  Music	  provides	  a	  more	  sanguine	  view	  of	  overproduction.	  Here	  the	  record	  companies	  portrayed	  their	  contracts	  and	  copyrights	  benevolently,	  arguing	  that	  they	  facilitated	  the	  sponsorship	  of	  new	  British	  performers.	  They	  maintained:	  	  
If	  material	  modifications	  were	  made	  to	  the	  key	  provisions	  in	  recording	  contracts,	  dealing	  in	  particular	  with	  the	  extent	  of	  copyright	  acquired	  by	  the	  record	  company,	  the	  length	  of	  the	  contract	  and	  the	  exclusivity	  provisions	  imposed	  on	  the	  artist,	  then	  the	  companies	  would	  be	  forced	  to	  take	  a	  much	  more	  short-­‐term	  view	  of	  their	  relationship	  with	  artists,	  which	  would	  not	  only	  be	  detrimental	  to	  the	  longterm	  development	  of	  those	  artists,	  but	  which	  would	  inevitably	  mean	  that	  the	  companies	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  invest	  as	  widely	  in	  new	  UK	  artists	  as	  they	  did	  at	  present.	  (MMC	  1994,	  pp.	  251-­‐2)	  In	  the	  1990s,	  British	  record	  companies	  began	  to	  enter	  into	  closer	  dialogue	  with	  governments.	  Cloonan	  noted	  that	  ‘key	  people	  in	  the	  popular	  music	  industries	  came	  to	  realize	  that	  politicians	  needed	  to	  be	  lobbied’	  (2007,	  p.	  21).	  In	  part,	  this	  was	  because	  their	  industries	  were	  being	  scrutinised:	  The	  Supply	  of	  Recorded	  
Music	  was	  one	  of	  a	  number	  of	  official	  investigations.	  It	  was	  also	  because	  governments	  were	  keen	  to	  open	  dialogue.	  This	  interest	  was	  reflective	  of	  an	  era	  in	  which	  the	  profits	  of	  heavy	  industry	  had	  declined	  while	  those	  of	  the	  cultural	  industries	  had	  grown	  (ibid.,	  p.	  39).	  	   Cloonan	  argued	  that	  the	  record	  companies	  were	  in	  need	  of	  ‘an	  image-­‐building	  exercise’;	  adding,	  ‘Clearly	  at	  a	  time	  when	  cultural	  policy	  was	  increasingly	  becoming	  part	  of	  economic	  policy	  and	  when	  the	  music	  industries	  seemingly	  felt	  some	  unease	  about	  stressing	  pop’s	  cultural	  value,	  the	  pragmatic	  response	  was	  to	  make	  the	  economic	  case’	  (ibid.,	  p.	  75).	  The	  argument	  they	  made	  was	  nevertheless	  balanced	  between	  the	  two.	  While	  the	  record	  companies	  promoted	  their	  economic	  worth,	  they	  also	  sought	  protection.	  In	  doing	  so,	  their	  promotion	  of	  new	  music	  leant	  more	  towards	  its	  aesthetic	  and	  cultural	  qualities	  
than	  it	  did	  to	  financial	  policy.	  There	  was	  no	  mention	  of	  portfolio	  management	  or	  budget	  calculations;	  instead	  there	  was	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  risk-­‐taking	  nature	  of	  supporting	  the	  new.	  There	  was	  less	  talk	  about	  the	  search	  for	  the	  next	  blockbuster	  acts	  than	  there	  was	  about	  supporting	  the	  marginal,	  the	  challenging	  and	  the	  forward-­‐looking.	  The	  companies	  stressed	  they	  were	  signing	  ‘creative’	  artists	  and	  issuing	  ‘innovative	  music’;	  they	  were	  prepared	  to	  sponsor	  acts	  with	  ‘minority	  appeal’	  (MMC	  1994,	  pp.	  230,	  247,	  252).	  They	  were	  also	  patriotic,	  providing	  investment	  for	  ‘new	  UK	  artists’	  (ibid.,	  p.	  252).	  	  In	  making	  their	  case	  to	  the	  MMC,	  the	  record	  companies	  drew	  upon	  an	  earlier	  instance	  of	  successful	  lobbying.	  In	  support	  of	  proposals	  for	  the	  EC	  Rental	  Directive,	  the	  European	  Commission	  claimed	  the	  ‘large-­‐scale	  investments’	  of	  record	  companies’	  ‘have	  to	  be	  protected’,	  as	  this	  would	  enable	  the	  companies	  ‘to	  contribute	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  authors	  and	  performing	  artists’:	  Only	  if	  such	  investment	  is	  protected	  will	  producers	  et	  al	  be	  able	  to	  invest	  not	  only	  in	  productions	  which	  are	  oriented	  towards	  pure	  commercial	  success	  and	  which	  would	  therefore	  guarantee	  a	  certain	  income,	  but	  also	  in	  such	  productions	  which	  are	  novel,	  particularly	  demanding	  or	  unusual	  in	  any	  respect	  and	  therefore	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  financially	  rewarding,	  but	  which	  still	  represent	  a	  necessary	  contribution	  to	  the	  increasingly	  threatened	  diversity	  of	  culture.	  (ibid.,	  p.	  209)	  Cloonan	  depicted	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  ‘music	  industries’	  commonsense	  view	  of	  the	  world’	  began	  to	  permeate	  British	  governments	  (2007,	  p.	  41).	  Although	  Negus’s	  contemporary	  research	  had	  revealed	  a	  system	  of	  tight	  financial	  control	  and	  restricted	  musical	  innovation,	  the	  record	  companies	  stressed	  that	  they	  were	  risk	  taking.	  This	  tactic	  was	  employed	  in	  one	  of	  the	  first	  investigations	  into	  the	  
record	  business	  undertaken	  in	  this	  period,	  the	  National	  Heritage	  Committee’s	  1993	  Inquiry	  into	  CD	  Prices.	  The	  major	  companies	  suggested	  they	  were	  involved	  in	  ‘a	  high	  risk	  business’.	  The	  Committee	  only	  noted	  that	  they	  ‘can	  be’,	  however	  (ibid.,	  p.	  70).	  	  
The	  Supply	  of	  Recorded	  Music,	  published	  the	  following	  year,	  evidences	  a	  new	  level	  of	  accord	  with	  the	  record	  industry.	  There	  was	  now	  agreement	  that	  it	  was	  a	  ‘high-­‐risk	  business’,	  driven	  by	  the	  search	  for	  new	  artists	  (1994,	  p.	  4).	  The	  record	  companies	  had	  much	  to	  gain	  by	  highlighting	  their	  risk-­‐taking	  deeds.	  They	  were	  used	  in	  defence	  of	  their	  ownership	  of	  sound	  recording	  copyright:	  the	  MMC	  conceded	  that	  ‘since	  the	  record	  companies	  take	  the	  risk	  of	  investing	  in	  artists	  when	  they	  are	  unknown,	  they	  should	  not	  have	  the	  rewards	  taken	  away	  on	  those	  occasions	  when	  their	  investment	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  successful’	  (ibid.,	  p.	  30);	  they	  supported	  the	  system	  of	  exclusive,	  long-­‐term	  contracts:	  the	  companies	  argued	  that	  these	  provided	  the	  platform	  from	  which	  ‘to	  take	  the	  very	  significant	  risks	  in	  investing	  in	  new	  artists’	  (ibid.,	  p.	  251);	  and	  they	  justified	  the	  high	  price	  of	  CDs:	  the	  labels	  maintained	  that	  by	  controlling	  these	  costs	  they	  could	  ‘generate	  sufficient	  funds	  to	  invest	  in	  […]	  new	  music	  and	  artists’	  (ibid.,	  p.	  230).	  	  Although	  the	  MMC	  endorsed	  each	  of	  the	  record	  companies’	  claims,	  their	  suggestions	  did	  not	  go	  uncontested.	  Giving	  evidence	  to	  the	  Commission,	  the	  IMF	  questioned	  the	  companies’	  quantification	  of	  success.	  They	  argued	  that	  the	  one	  in	  ten	  success	  ratio	  was	  based	  on	  a	  short-­‐term	  analysis	  of	  an	  artist’s	  profitability,	  pointing	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  record	  companies	  would	  retain	  copyright	  in	  the	  sound	  recordings	  for	  50	  years,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  an	  artist	  was	  signed	  to	  them.	  Consequently,	  it	  could	  accrue	  income	  long	  after	  an	  artist	  had	  been	  dropped	  on	  account	  of	  non-­‐profitability.	  They	  noted	  that,	  whereas	  the	  losses	  from	  
‘unsuccessful’	  artists	  would	  be	  detailed	  in	  company	  balance	  sheets,	  the	  value	  of	  their	  copyright	  catalogues	  would	  not	  appear	  there	  (ibid.,	  p.	  173).	  The	  IMF	  proposed	  instead	  a	  shorter	  term	  of	  sound	  recording	  copyright,	  suggesting	  a	  period	  of	  10	  years,	  after	  which	  the	  rights	  would	  ‘revert’	  to	  the	  artist.	  This,	  they	  believed,	  would	  give	  artists	  greater	  bargaining	  power	  in	  their	  negotiations	  with	  the	  industry,	  as	  the	  value	  of	  these	  copyrights	  would	  reduce	  the	  need	  to	  ‘obtain	  capital	  [...]	  on	  disadvantageous	  terms’	  (ibid.,	  p.	  211).	  The	  IMF	  maintained	  that	  the	  ‘more	  genuinely	  competitive	  environment	  that	  would	  follow	  from	  these	  changes	  would	  [...]	  also	  lead	  to	  lower	  prices	  to	  the	  consumer,	  due	  to	  the	  greater	  efficiency	  that	  would	  ensue	  from	  this	  heightened	  level	  of	  competition	  (ibid.).	  	  	   Others,	  too,	  have	  queried	  the	  record	  companies’	  benevolent	  self-­‐portrayal.	  Miles	  Copeland,	  who	  has	  had	  a	  successful	  career	  as	  both	  a	  manager	  and	  as	  a	  head	  of	  record	  labels,	  stated	  that	  ‘If	  you’re	  trying	  to	  build	  a	  record	  company,	  and	  you’re	  trying	  to	  build	  an	  asset,	  what	  you	  really	  try	  to	  do	  is	  you	  try	  to	  find	  a	  young	  artist	  that	  you	  can	  sign	  and	  develop’	  (Stahl	  2013,	  p.	  155).	  While	  he	  stressed	  these	  are	  ‘the	  riskiest	  ones’,	  he	  admitted	  they	  are	  ‘where	  you’re	  going	  to	  get	  the	  most	  return.	  When	  I	  go	  to	  the	  marketplace	  to	  try	  to	  borrow	  additional	  money,	  or	  get	  investment	  in	  my	  company,	  they’re	  going	  to	  look	  at	  what	  are	  the	  potential	  returns	  of	  [my]	  company’	  (ibid.).	  New	  artists	  offer	  good	  returns	  because	  they	  are	  contractually	  weak.	  In	  a	  competitive	  business,	  in	  which	  only	  a	  small	  proportion	  of	  artists	  are	  successful	  and	  an	  even	  smaller	  proportion	  is	  signed,	  a	  prospective	  artist	  has	  little	  bargaining	  power.	  Those	  who	  do	  manage	  to	  secure	  record	  company	  interest	  will	  generally	  be	  on	  lower	  royalty	  rates	  than	  established	  artists	  and	  their	  contracts	  will	  contain	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  restrictive	  clauses	  (Dannen,	  2003,	  p.	  79;	  Jones	  
2012,	  p.	  52;	  Negus	  1992,	  pp.	  149-­‐50).	  Anita	  Elberse	  has	  argued	  that	  ‘Locking	  acts	  in	  when	  they	  do	  not	  yet	  have	  any	  bargaining	  power	  ensures	  that	  the	  labels	  can	  benefit	  longer	  from	  their	  investments	  in	  talent	  development’	  (2014,	  p.	  199).	  Leslie	  F.	  Hill,	  while	  a	  director	  at	  EMI,	  conceded	  that	  new	  artists	  have	  ‘the	  greatest	  profit	  potential	  for	  the	  company’	  (1978,	  p.	  35).	  In	  their	  dialogue	  with	  governments,	  record	  companies	  have	  claimed	  their	  ownership	  of	  copyright	  and	  restrictive	  contractual	  system	  support	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  music.	  The	  reverse	  is	  also	  true:	  it	  is	  new	  music	  that	  supports	  the	  record	  companies’	  system	  of	  ownership	  and	  control.	  Given	  that	  the	  sponsorship	  of	  new	  artists	  makes	  record	  companies	  look	  good	  as	  well	  as	  helping	  to	  ensure	  their	  profitability,	  it	  is	  little	  wonder	  that	  has	  been	  emphasised	  in	  further	  industry	  campaigns.	  	  
New	  uses	  for	  new	  music	  In	  the	  21st	  century,	  the	  British	  record	  industry	  has	  sought	  governmental	  backing	  in	  two	  key	  areas:	  the	  need	  to	  combat	  the	  digital	  piracy	  of	  sound	  recording	  copyright,	  and	  their	  desire	  to	  increase	  the	  duration	  of	  its	  term.	  In	  both	  cases	  new	  music	  has	  been	  utilised.	  
Consumers	  Call	  the	  Tune,	  issued	  in	  2000,	  was	  the	  first	  British	  governmental	  report	  to	  consider	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  ‘on-­‐line	  revolution’	  on	  the	  music	  industries	  (DCMS	  2000,	  p.	  3).	  It	  contains	  a	  call	  for	  ministers	  to	  take	  action	  against	  the	  digital	  theft	  of	  the	  record	  companies’	  copyrights;	  in	  his	  foreword	  to	  the	  document,	  Chris	  Smith	  noted	  this	  is	  ‘a	  message	  we	  hear	  loud	  and	  clear’	  (DCMS	  2000,	  p.	  3).	  The	  record	  companies	  argued	  that	  failure	  to	  bolster	  intellectual	  property	  laws	  would	  reduce	  the	  supply	  of	  new	  music.	  Martin	  Mills,	  
head	  of	  Beggars	  Banquet,	  maintained,	  ‘if	  today’s	  music	  isn’t	  paid	  for,	  tomorrow’s	  music	  won’t	  be	  made’	  (DCMS	  2000	  5).	  Geoff	  Taylor,	  Chief	  Executive	  of	  the	  British	  Phonograph	  Industry,	  evidenced	  similar	  logic	  in	  Digital	  Music	  Nation	  2010,	  a	  campaigning	  report	  issued	  by	  his	  institution.	  He	  claimed	  that,	  via	  a	  more	  tightly	  policed	  internet,	  not	  only	  do	  we	  give	  our	  music	  the	  chance	  to	  flourish,	  but	  we	  will	  spur	  on	  digital	  innovation	  and	  investment.	  If	  we	  falter	  and	  lack	  the	  courage	  to	  act,	  we	  risk	  creating	  a	  serious	  cultural	  deficit	  in	  the	  UK.	  The	  voices	  of	  a	  generation	  of	  new	  bands	  and	  artists	  simply	  won’t	  get	  signed	  and	  won’t	  be	  heard.	  (BPI	  2010,	  p.	  2).	  The	  lobbying	  for	  an	  increased	  term	  of	  sound	  recording	  copyright	  began	  in	  2002,	  when	  Phonographic	  Performance	  Ltd	  (PPL),	  the	  record	  company-­‐owned	  collecting	  society	  that	  licences	  the	  use	  of	  recorded	  music	  in	  public,	  first	  raised	  the	  issue	  with	  the	  DCMS	  (Music	  Week	  2011,	  p.	  5).	  Further	  impetus	  came	  in	  2004,	  when	  the	  trade	  journal	  Music	  Week	  launched	  a	  support	  campaign	  (Music	  Week	  2004,	  pp.	  6-­‐7).	  By	  2006,	  the	  record	  companies’	  case	  was	  being	  heard	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Gowers	  Review	  of	  Intellectual	  Property,	  commissioned	  by	  Gordon	  Brown	  when	  Chancellor	  of	  the	  Exchequer	  (Gowers,	  2006,	  p.	  48).	  Indeed,	  according	  to	  Nicholas	  Cook,	  the	  campaign	  was	  ‘one	  of	  the	  specific	  reasons	  why	  the	  Gowers	  Review	  was	  set	  up’	  (2012,	  p.	  608).	  	  In	  making	  their	  case,	  the	  British	  record	  companies	  argued	  that	  ‘extension	  of	  term	  would	  increase	  the	  incentives	  to	  invest	  in	  new	  music	  [...]	  as	  there	  would	  be	  longer	  to	  recoup	  any	  initial	  outlay	  (Gowers	  2006,	  p.	  49).	  Music	  Week	  maintained	  that	  if	  the	  50-­‐year	  term	  remained	  in	  place,	  record	  companies	  would	  take	  fewer	  risks:	  ‘labels	  will	  invest	  in	  safer	  options,	  they	  will	  stop	  backing	  the	  
challenging	  artists	  for	  which	  the	  UK	  is	  renowned’	  (Music	  Week	  2006,	  p.	  9).	  Making	  the	  case	  for	  extension	  was	  to	  prove	  harder	  than	  enlisting	  support	  for	  copyright	  infringement,	  however.	  In	  seeking	  evidence	  that	  a	  longer	  term	  ‘would	  increase	  the	  incentives	  for	  record	  companies	  to	  invest	  in	  new	  acts’,	  Andrew	  Gowers	  was	  informed	  by	  17	  economists,	  ‘including	  five	  Nobel	  Prize	  winners’,	  that	  any	  extra	  money	  generated	  would	  be	  ‘negligible’	  (Gowers	  2006,	  p.	  52).	  The	  economists	  argued	  that	  ‘most	  sound	  recordings	  sell	  in	  the	  ten	  years	  after	  release,	  and	  only	  a	  very	  small	  percentage	  continue	  to	  generate	  income,	  both	  from	  sales	  and	  royalty	  payments,	  for	  the	  entire	  duration	  of	  copyright’	  (ibid.).	  The	  
Gowers	  Report	  pours	  scorn	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  longer	  life	  of	  copyright	  will	  provide	  younger	  musicians	  with	  ‘incentives	  to	  make	  music’	  (ibid.).	  Giving	  evidence,	  Dave	  Rowntree	  commented,	  ‘I	  have	  never	  heard	  of	  a	  single	  one	  [band]	  deciding	  not	  to	  record	  a	  song	  because	  it	  will	  fall	  out	  of	  copyright	  in	  “only”	  fifty	  years.	  The	  idea	  is	  laughable’	  (ibid.).	  More	  generally,	  the	  report	  argues	  that	  extension	  will	  benefit	  established	  stars	  rather	  than	  nascent	  artists	  (ibid.,	  p.	  51).	  	  	   It	  was	  suggested	  elsewhere	  that	  new	  artists	  might	  actually	  suffer	  a	  decline	  in	  public	  performance	  royalties.	  John	  Smith,	  general	  secretary	  of	  the	  Musicians’	  Union,	  pointed	  out	  that	  ‘under	  blanket	  licence	  arrangements	  all	  an	  extension	  of	  term	  would	  do	  is	  dilute	  the	  existing	  pot	  by	  adding	  more	  repertoire’	  (Smith	  2006,	  p.	  8).	  Each	  performance	  would	  receive	  a	  smaller	  distribution	  royalty,	  as	  the	  total	  money	  generated	  by	  broadcasting	  and	  public	  premises	  licences	  would	  not	  be	  raised.	  Daniel	  Byrne	  believed	  that	  the	  remaining	  income	  would	  be	  skewed	  towards	  established	  artists,	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  copyright	  term	  would	  reward	  ‘unproductive	  performers’	  while	  distributing	  less	  money	  to	  ‘younger	  acts’	  (Stanley	  2011).	  The	  balance	  could	  be	  skewed	  further	  still,	  as	  record	  companies	  
would	  consequently	  focus	  greater	  attention	  on	  these	  unproductive	  artists.	  According	  to	  Jason	  Toynbee	  a	  longer	  term	  would	  encourage	  the	  music	  industry	  ‘to	  promote	  stars	  and	  “classic”	  songs	  and	  recordings’,	  as	  they	  could	  ‘create	  economic	  value	  from	  them	  with	  very	  little	  extra	  investment’	  (Toynbee	  2004,	  p.	  133).	  	  There	  was	  a	  sense	  that	  the	  record	  companies	  had	  stretched	  themselves	  too	  far.	  Earlier	  claims	  that	  only	  one	  in	  ten	  artists	  succeed	  could	  not	  be	  squared	  with	  a	  belief	  that	  copyright	  extension	  would	  benefit	  new	  acts.	  The	  Gowers	  Report	  instead	  reminds	  us	  that:	  Eighty	  per	  cent	  of	  albums	  never	  recoup	  costs	  and	  so	  no	  royalties	  are	  paid	  to	  the	  creator.	  […]	  If	  the	  purpose	  of	  extension	  is	  to	  increase	  revenue	  to	  artists,	  given	  the	  low	  number	  of	  recordings	  still	  making	  money	  50	  years	  after	  release,	  it	  seems	  that	  a	  more	  sensible	  starting	  point	  would	  be	  to	  review	  the	  contractual	  arrangements	  for	  the	  percentages	  artists	  receive.	  (2006,	  p.	  51)	  Gowers	  rejected	  the	  record	  companies’	  logic,	  arguing	  that	  term	  extension	  ‘would	  not	  increase	  the	  incentives	  to	  invest,	  would	  not	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  works	  created	  or	  made	  available,	  and	  would	  negatively	  impact	  upon	  consumers	  and	  industry’	  (ibid.,	  p.	  56).	  	  	   In	  coming	  to	  his	  conclusions,	  he	  reached	  back	  to	  early	  debates	  about	  copyright.	  Britain’s	  first	  copyright	  law,	  the	  1710	  Statute	  of	  Anne,	  makes	  its	  intentions	  clear	  in	  its	  title.	  It	  is	  ‘An	  act	  for	  the	  encouragement	  of	  learning,	  by	  vesting	  the	  copies	  of	  printed	  books	  in	  the	  authors	  or	  publishers	  of	  such	  copies,	  during	  the	  times	  therein	  mentioned’.	  The	  Act	  strikes	  a	  balance:	  as	  an	  incentive	  to	  produce,	  there	  should	  be	  copyright	  in	  artistic	  works;	  to	  ensure	  these	  works	  enter	  the	  public	  domain,	  and	  can	  therefore	  best	  inspire	  future	  authors,	  the	  term	  of	  
copyright	  should	  be	  limited.	  Gowers	  alluded	  to	  this	  trade-­‐off	  in	  his	  report,	  noting	  that	  a	  properly	  functioning	  copyright	  system	  is	  one	  where	  ‘incentive	  to	  innovate	  is	  balanced	  against	  the	  ability	  of	  follow-­‐on	  innovators	  to	  access	  knowledge’	  (ibid.,	  p.	  45).	  He	  also	  quoted	  Lord	  Macaulay,	  who	  argued	  in	  1841	  that	  ‘it	  is	  good	  that	  authors	  should	  be	  remunerated;	  and	  the	  least	  exceptionable	  way	  of	  remunerating	  them	  is	  by	  a	  monopoly.	  Yet	  monopoly	  is	  an	  evil.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  good	  we	  must	  submit	  to	  the	  evil;	  but	  the	  evil	  ought	  not	  to	  last	  a	  day	  longer	  than	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  securing	  the	  good’	  (ibid.,	  p.	  50).	  According	  to	  this	  belief,	  it	  is	  a	  limited	  duration	  of	  copyright	  that	  encourages	  new	  work.3	  	  	   This	  was	  nevertheless	  not	  the	  end	  of	  the	  campaign	  for	  copyright	  extension	  and	  nor	  was	  it	  the	  end	  of	  record	  companies’	  enlistment	  of	  political	  support.	  The	  pro-­‐extension	  campaigners	  turned	  their	  focus	  upon	  the	  European	  parliament.	  To	  this	  end,	  John	  Kennedy	  of	  IFPI	  and	  John	  Smith	  of	  the	  Musicians’	  Union	  met	  with	  Charlie	  McCreevy,	  European	  Commissioner	  for	  Internal	  Market	  and	  Services.	  In	  February	  2008,	  McCreevy	  launched	  a	  proposal,	  seeking	  a	  sound	  recording	  copyright	  term	  for	  the	  EU	  of	  95	  years.	  After	  three	  more	  years	  of	  debating	  and	  redrafting,	  during	  which	  Britain’s	  Labour	  government	  eventually	  came	  out	  in	  favour	  of	  term	  extension,	  the	  European	  Parliament	  agreed	  on	  a	  period	  of	  70	  years	  (Harkins	  2012,	  p.	  642).	  	  	   In	  celebrating	  this	  outcome,	  Geoff	  Taylor	  could	  not	  resist	  mentioning	  new	  music:	  ‘A	  longer	  copyright	  term	  is	  also	  good	  news	  for	  music	  fans,	  as	  it	  will	  ensure	  that	  UK	  record	  labels	  can	  continue	  to	  reinvest	  income	  from	  sales	  of	  early	  recordings	  in	  supporting	  new	  British	  talent.	  (Ashton	  2011).	  Fran	  Nevrkla,	  chairman	  of	  PPL,	  stated	  similarly,	  ‘The	  enhanced	  copyright	  framework	  will	  […]	  enable	  the	  record	  companies,	  big	  and	  small,	  to	  continue	  investing	  in	  new	  
recordings	  and	  new	  talent’	  (ibid.).	  	  	   The	  rhetoric	  of	  risk-­‐taking	  investment	  has	  been	  employed	  to	  safeguard	  the	  record	  companies’	  ownership	  of	  sound	  recording	  copyright,	  to	  defend	  this	  copyright	  from	  piracy,	  and	  to	  extend	  its	  term.	  A	  measure	  of	  the	  companies’	  faith	  in	  this	  rhetoric	  is	  that	  it	  has	  been	  adopted	  by	  IFPI,	  their	  global	  trade	  body.	  Moreover,	  investment	  in	  new	  music	  is	  now	  being	  used	  for	  an	  all-­‐encompassing	  cause:	  to	  explain	  the	  need	  for	  record	  companies.	  	  
Investing	  in	  music	  The	  profitability	  of	  record	  companies	  has	  fallen.	  IFPI	  has	  charted	  a	  decline	  in	  global	  income	  from	  US$	  27.3bn	  in	  1999	  to	  US$	  14.9bn	  in	  2014	  (IFPI	  2012B,	  p.	  7;	  IFPI	  2015,	  p.	  6).	  Biennially	  since	  2010,	  this	  organisation	  has	  issued	  Investing	  in	  
Music	  reports,	  arguing	  that,	  despite	  this	  decline,	  record	  companies	  offer	  prospective	  artists	  their	  best	  chance	  of	  success.	  Ann	  Harrison	  believes	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  reports	  is	  to	  ‘debunk	  suggestions	  that	  an	  artist	  can	  develop	  careers	  in	  the	  business	  without	  needing	  a	  label’	  (2011,	  p.	  64).	  The	  reports	  suggest	  as	  much,	  maintaining	  ‘There	  has	  been	  a	  mistaken	  belief	  among	  some	  that	  the	  role	  of	  labels	  would	  be	  diminished	  in	  the	  digital	  age’	  (IFPI	  2014,	  p.	  6).	  	  	   In	  making	  their	  case,	  IFPI	  have	  stressed	  that	  new	  artists	  are	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  record	  companies’	  concerns:	  each	  report	  claims	  they	  are	  the	  ‘lifeblood’	  of	  the	  industry	  (2010,	  p.	  6-­‐7;	  2012A,	  pp.	  7,	  9;	  2014,	  p.	  6).	  The	  reports	  offer	  daunting	  figures	  regarding	  the	  amount	  of	  money	  it	  costs	  to	  break	  a	  new	  act.	  A	  spend	  of	  ‘between	  US$200,000	  and	  US$500,000’	  in	  2012	  had	  risen	  to	  ‘US$500,000-­‐2,000,000’	  by	  2014	  (2012A,	  p.	  11;	  2014,	  p.	  7).	  What	  they	  do	  not	  admit	  is	  that	  these	  costs	  are	  partly	  attributable	  to	  the	  companies’	  escalating	  promotional	  
wars,	  which	  are	  in	  turn	  derived	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  more	  artists	  are	  signed	  than	  will	  succeed.	  There	  is	  one	  concession	  to	  previous	  practice,	  however.	  The	  one	  in	  ten	  ratio	  is	  revised.	  Left	  as	  it	  was,	  it	  could	  have	  been	  taken	  as	  evidence	  that	  record	  companies	  are	  not	  viable:	  why	  sign	  with	  them	  if	  there	  is	  only	  a	  slim	  chance	  you	  will	  succeed?	  Consequently,	  the	  2012	  report	  tells	  us	  ‘the	  most	  common	  estimate	  cited	  by	  senior	  music	  company	  management	  is	  a	  success	  ratio	  of	  one	  in	  five.	  This	  is	  more	  than	  the	  commonly	  estimated	  one	  in	  ten	  ratio	  of	  a	  decade	  ago,	  reflecting	  a	  generally	  higher	  success	  rate	  than	  was	  previously	  the	  norm’	  (2012A,	  p.	  11).4	  However,	  just	  as	  record	  companies	  provided	  little	  evidence	  for	  their	  earlier	  statistic,	  this	  revision	  is	  offered	  without	  any	  proof.	  	  The	  ratio	  is	  balanced	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  record	  labels	  support	  a	  ‘wide	  community	  of	  artists,	  many	  of	  whom	  will	  not	  be	  commercially	  successful’	  (2010,	  p.	  5).	  Failure	  is	  employed	  as	  a	  means	  of	  demonstrating	  altruistic	  ways.	  IFPI	  claim	  that,	  while	  ‘Continually	  investing	  in	  new	  talent	  is	  a	  hugely	  risky	  business’,	  it	  is	  record	  companies	  who	  ‘shoulder	  the	  financial	  risk	  inherent	  in	  trying	  to	  break	  a	  new	  act’	  (2010,	  p.	  6;	  2014,	  p.	  5).	  According	  to	  Nick	  Raphael,	  president	  of	  Capitol	  Records	  UK:	  We	  put	  just	  as	  much	  effort	  and	  money,	  if	  not	  more	  so,	  into	  the	  acts	  that	  don’t	  succeed	  as	  with	  those	  that	  do.	  There	  may	  be	  any	  number	  of	  reasons	  why	  they	  don’t	  connect	  with	  the	  audience,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  for	  lack	  of	  effort	  and	  support	  from	  labels	  that	  want	  them	  to	  succeed.	  (2014,	  p.	  9)	  	  There	  is	  no	  mention	  of	  the	  strategic	  prioritisation	  of	  acts.	  The	  reports	  claim	  instead	  that	  ‘longterm’	  contractual	  involvement	  is	  of	  benefit	  to	  artists.	  It	  allows	  them	  ‘to	  develop	  their	  own	  brand	  identity	  and	  earn	  a	  living	  from	  different	  
sources’	  (2010,	  p.	  7).	  	  It	  is	  not	  just	  prospective	  artists	  who	  are	  expected	  to	  read	  these	  reports,	  but	  also	  policy	  makers	  within	  governments.	  To	  this	  end,	  IFPI	  claim	  that	  investment	  in	  new	  music	  benefits	  ‘the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole’	  and	  that	  record	  companies	  have	  ‘sustained	  their	  investment	  in	  artists	  despite	  the	  significant	  fall-­‐off	  in	  overall	  sales	  revenue’	  (ibid.,	  pp.	  5,	  7).	  The	  reports	  provide	  a	  reminder	  that	  ‘A&R	  spending	  today	  [...]	  is	  under	  greater	  pressure	  than	  ever	  from	  the	  impact	  of	  illegal	  file-­‐sharing	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  piracy’	  (ibid.,	  p.	  9)	  and	  they	  boast	  that	  record	  companies	  invest	  more	  money	  in	  ‘research	  and	  development’	  than	  the	  pharmaceutical	  and	  biotechnology	  sector	  (2012A,	  p.	  9;	  2014,	  p.	  9).	  In	  order	  to	  continue	  this	  practice,	  however,	  the	  record	  companies’	  ownership	  of	  copyright	  needs	  to	  be	  maintained:	  It	  is	  copyright	  that	  makes	  investment	  in	  music	  possible.	  It	  is	  copyright	  that	  allows	  the	  industry	  that	  helps	  artists	  gain	  a	  return	  on	  its	  investment,	  and	  therefore	  plough	  back	  new	  funds	  and	  resources	  into	  the	  next	  generation	  of	  talent.	  And	  it	  is	  copyright	  which	  underlies	  the	  endeavours,	  the	  risks	  and	  the	  successes	  that	  fill	  the	  pages	  of	  this	  report.	  (ibid.,	  p.	  4)	  The	  2014	  Investing	  in	  Music	  report	  come	  closes	  to	  declaring	  the	  record	  companies’	  self-­‐interest.	  Placido	  Domingo,	  Chairman	  of	  IFPI,	  states	  that	  ‘instead	  of	  calling	  this	  report	  Investing	  in	  Music,	  it	  could	  also	  be	  titled	  Investing	  in	  
Copyright’	  (2014,	  p.	  4).	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  however,	  this	  investment	  is	  not	  discussed	  as	  resulting	  in	  something	  that	  the	  record	  companies	  will	  profit	  from	  or	  own.	  The	  suggestion,	  instead,	  is	  that	  any	  income	  derived	  from	  this	  right	  will	  be	  ploughed	  back	  into	  the	  future:	  IFPI	  claim	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  record	  companies’	  copyright	  income	  is	  spent	  on	  new	  music,	  as	  labels	  ‘reinvest	  the	  proceeds	  of	  
successful	  campaigns	  in	  the	  discovery	  and	  nurturing	  of	  the	  next	  generation	  of	  talent’	  (2012A,	  p.	  7).	  In	  reaching	  this	  formulation,	  they	  provide	  a	  phrase	  that	  the	  record	  companies	  have	  been	  grasping	  for	  in	  each	  of	  their	  campaigns	  and	  reports:	  what	  they	  are	  peddling	  is	  a	  ‘virtuous	  cycle	  of	  investment’	  (2010,	  p.	  5).	  This	  honourable	  inflection	  has	  been	  implied	  whenever	  they	  have	  combined	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  their	  success	  rate	  with	  their	  rhetoric	  of	  newness.	  	  
Conclusion	  The	  economic	  wellbeing	  of	  record	  companies	  has	  been	  underpinned	  by	  two	  rhetorical	  tropes.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  only	  one	  in	  ten	  artists	  succeeds;	  the	  second	  is	  that	  they	  are	  supporters	  of	  new	  music.	  Both	  tropes	  are	  problematic.	  The	  labels’	  success	  ratios	  require	  verification	  and	  their	  nurturing	  abilities	  can	  be	  questioned.	  Artists	  who	  are	  not	  prioritised	  for	  promotion	  would	  hardly	  recommend	  their	  companies’	  virtues.	  Moreover,	  record	  companies	  might	  be	  signing	  new	  artists,	  quantitatively,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  their	  music	  is	  new,	  qualitatively.	  In	  the	  current	  century,	  for	  example,	  theories	  of	  ‘retromania’	  have	  taken	  hold	  (Reynolds	  2011).	  	   This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  either	  trope	  is	  baseless.	  The	  careers	  of	  most	  artists	  will	  end	  in	  failure	  and	  the	  record	  companies	  will	  right	  off	  these	  artists’	  losses.	  There	  is	  also	  an	  element	  of	  truth	  in	  the	  companies’	  risk-­‐taking	  propaganda.	  Until	  recently	  it	  has	  been	  hard	  to	  test	  their	  claims	  because	  there	  have	  been	  few	  alternatives	  to	  their	  policies.	  This	  hegemony	  is	  finally	  being	  challenged.	  The	  new	  decade	  has	  witnessed	  the	  rise	  of	  service	  companies,	  such	  as	  Kobalt,	  who	  perform	  many	  of	  the	  functions	  of	  a	  traditional	  record	  company	  but	  do	  not	  own	  their	  artists’	  copyrights.	  How	  can	  they	  afford	  this?	  The	  charge	  levelled	  against	  them	  is	  
that	  they	  do	  not	  take	  risks;	  they	  can	  forgo	  copyrights	  because	  their	  deals	  are	  reserved	  for	  proven	  artists	  who	  are	  old	  (Music	  Week	  2015,	  p.	  9).	  	   It	  would	  also	  be	  wrong	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  record	  companies	  thought	  out	  their	  rhetoric	  first	  and	  subsequently	  went	  in	  search	  of	  failure	  and	  novelty.	  The	  reverse	  is	  the	  case.	  To	  acknowledge	  this	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  their	  strategies,	  however.	  The	  important	  thing	  to	  monitor	  is	  how	  failure	  and	  novelty	  have	  been	  utilised	  to	  the	  record	  companies’	  advantage.	  There	  are	  many	  aspects	  of	  industry	  practice	  that	  require	  greater	  scrutiny,	  notably	  the	  exclusive,	  long-­‐term	  nature	  of	  recording	  contracts	  and	  the	  record	  companies’	  ownership	  of	  sound	  recording	  copyrights.	  One	  reason	  why	  they	  have	  not	  received	  sufficient	  questioning	  is	  because	  of	  the	  high	  success	  rate	  of	  their	  rhetoric.	  	  	  
Notes	  
                                                
1 Clause	  9.2a	  was	  later	  updated.	  The	  Copyright	  and	  Related	  Rights	  Regulations	  of	  1996	  separated	  sound	  recording	  copyright	  and	  film	  into	  two	  new	  clauses	  (CRRR	  1996).	  Clause	  9.2aa	  of	  the	  Copyright,	  Designs	  and	  Patents	  Act	  states	  that	  ‘in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  sound	  recording’	  the	  author	  is	  ‘the	  producer’,	  a	  term	  that	  is	  clarified	  using	  the	  old	  wording	  of	  the	  act:	  ‘the	  person	  by	  whom	  the	  arrangements	  necessary	  for	  the	  making	  of	  the	  sound	  recording	  are	  undertaken’.	  Clause	  9.2ab	  provides	  a	  more	  radical	  amendment.	  The	  authors	  of	  a	  film	  are	  now	  taken	  to	  be	  ‘the	  producer	  and	  the	  principal	  director’.	  Where	  ownership	  was	  once	  taken	  to	  reside	  solely	  in	  the	  party	  that	  arranged	  the	  production,	  the	  Act	  now	  awards	  part-­‐ownership	  to	  one	  of	  the	  artistic	  creators. 
                                                                                                                                       2	  The	  major	  exceptions	  are	  self-­‐releases	  or	  licence	  deals.	  In	  licence	  deals	  artists,	  production	  companies	  and	  smaller	  record	  labels	  create	  and	  finance	  recordings,	  which	  they	  licence	  to	  a	  larger	  record	  company	  for	  release	  while	  retaining	  the	  underlying	  copyright	  ownership	  (Harrison	  2011,	  pp.	  78-­‐9).	  
3	  It	  could	  nevertheless	  be	  argued	  that,	  just	  as	  the	  decisions	  of	  artists	  are	  not	  affected	  by	  a	  longer	  term	  of	  copyright,	  their	  access	  to	  music	  would	  be	  little	  affected	  by	  a	  shorter	  term	  (Osborne	  2015).	  
4	  The	  2010	  report	  states	  that	  ‘Estimates	  of	  the	  success	  ratio	  vary	  between	  one	  in	  five	  and	  one	  in	  ten	  (2010,	  p.	  7).	  Curiously,	  the	  latest	  report	  has	  returned	  to	  this	  state	  of	  uncertainty,	  stating,	  ‘There	  is	  no	  single	  authoritative	  figure	  for	  the	  proportion	  of	  record	  companies’	  signings	  that	  are	  commercially	  successful,	  but	  a	  common	  estimate	  is	  between	  one	  in	  five	  and	  one	  in	  ten’	  (2014,	  p.	  8).	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